Criminologists

Criminologists & Forensic Experts

United States v. Maher, 454 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2006). Police officer testifies in narcotics trial that based on his training and experience, numerical notation on papers was part of defendant's customer order list. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. This fell on the lay opinion side of the dividing line between lay and expert testimony.

United States v. Mahone, 453 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2006). In bank robbery trial, footwear impression expert Cynthia Homer testifies that footprints at scene of crime match shoes with defendant's DNA found nearby. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Expert was qualified; she holds masters degree in forensic science and has performed over 11,000 footwear comparisons. Defendant questions reliability of "ACE-V" method of footwear comparison (analysis, comparison, evaluation, and verification), based on arguments similar to those sometimes raised against fingerprint identification. But district court acted within its discretion in accepting ACE-V methodology based on published studies, its error rate, and its general acceptance in forensic field.

United States v. Pinillos-Prieto, 419 F.3d 61 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 817 (2005). Law enforcement officer testifies in narcotics trial that drug operations often involve guns and violence. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Testimony was admissible as lay opinion.

United States v. Pina, No. 04-1029 (1st Cir. July 15, 2005) (unpublished). Police officer testifies at narcotics trial that cocaine and other items found at defendant's apartment (scales, packages of cash, sandwich baggies) are "consistent with distribution." Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Defendant says testimony was not helpful to trier of fact, because items found were also "consistent with" other uses. But this testimony was permissible. Expert did not testify on defendant's intent.

United States v. Ayala-Pizarro, 407 F.3d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 247 (2005). In narcotics trial, arresting officer testifies for prosecution on how drug points work and how heroin is customarily packaged for sale. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Officer's testimony was based on his personal knowledge from his own experience as law enforcement officer. It was therefore lay opinion and not subject to rules governing admissibility of expert testimony.

United States v. Garcia-Morales, 382 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2004). In narcotics trial, Customs Service Agent Yariel Ramos testifies as prosecution expert on nature and structure of typical drug distribution conspiracies. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Defendant did not object to testimony below and so review is for plain error. Agent was qualified to offer expert testimony by experience, testimony was helpful to trier of fact, and evidence was not more prejudicial than probative.

United States v. Osorio, 360 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2004). In trial of defendant charged with possession of firearm by felon, prosecution witness testifies that weapon moved in interstate commerce. Defendant objects that witness was not designated as expert in prosecution's pretrial disclosures. District court overrules objection and jury convicts. Affirmed. Testimony was lay opinion, not expert opinion, because it was based on witness's personal visit to Massachusetts plant where weapon was manufactured, and because witness's conclusions were derived "from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life."

United States v. Casas, 356 F.3d 104 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1069 (2004). In drug conspiracy trial, prosecution calls DEA agent to give "overview" of evidence. Agent testifies based on his "investigation" that various defendants were members of drug smuggling organization. Jury convicts Admissibility reversed. Agent's "overview" testimony relied in part on hearsay. It cannot be defended as proper expert opinion, because prosecution did not qualify agent as expert, and because such "overview" testimony is not proper grist for expert opinion in any event. Jurors could evaluate for themselves, based on underlying evidence, whether any given defendant was member of drug conspiracy. Error was harmless as to some defendants.

United States v. Soto-Beniquez, 356 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003) (vol. 1) (vol. 2) (errata), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1074 (2004). In massive six-month drug conspiracy trial, prosecution successfully offers opinion testimony from eight forensics examiners, two pathologists, and one ballistics witness, without having formally designated any as experts. Admissibility affirmed. Forensic experts testified only to observations at crime scenes and opinions based on personal knowledge thus acquired. District court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that this constituted lay opinion, not expert opinion. Government substantially complied with pretrial discovery requirements as to pathologists and ballistics expert. One pathologist did testify based on autopsy report he did not prepare, due to preparer's last-minute unavailability due to illness. But no generalized prohibition bars experts from testifying about autopsy reports they did not personally prepare.

United States v. Santana, 342 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1206 (2004). DEA agent Jean Drouin observes defendant leave building with bag containing box-like object with rounded corners. At defendant's trial on drug charges, agent testifies that bag contained marijuana. Asked to supply basis for that opinion, agent responds that his conclusion was based on characteristics of package, intercepted phone calls, smell of marijuana in defendant's home during subsequent search, and other facts gleaned in investigation. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Defendant argues that agent should not have been permitted to testify that he smelled marijuana during search, whether as lay witness under Fed. R. Evid. 701 or as expert under Rule 702. But agent's lay opinion was grounded in facts within his personal knowledge under Rule 701, and expert testimony on this point was not required under Rule 702. Defendant also says it was error to permit agent to testify that he "knew" bag to contain marijuana. But agent was subjected to cross-examination in which his basis for that statement was explored, and any error was harmless.

United States v. Villarman-Oviedo, 325 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003). Defendant is charged with possessing narcotics with intent to distribute. DEA special agent Reinaldo Lopez listens to tape recordings of defendant's wiretapped conversations and is offered at trial to testify as expert concerning defendant's use of code words. Defendant objects. District court rules that testimony is admissible as lay opinion. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. It is unnecessary to decide whether testimony was properly characterized as lay opinion or expert opinion, because even if it fell in expert category, agent was qualified by training and experience to opine on meaning of code words in drug trade.

United States v. Mooney, 315 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2002). Prosecution expert testifies that criminal defendant's handwriting sample matches handwriting in several letters in which defendant acknowledged participation in robbery, and jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Defendant does not argue that expert's testimony should have been excluded entirely, but contends that expert's ultimate opinion that handwriting samples matched did not enjoy reliable forensic support. However, in opining that defendant authored letters, expert employed same methods that defendant concedes are reliable for purposes of analyzing similarities and differences in handwriting samples. Those methods have been subjected to general peer review in published journals, and one study has pegged their potential error rate at 6.5%. Also, expert was duly certified in field, takes proficiency tests twice per year, and has all analyses confirmed by second examiner. If expert's methods are sufficiently reliable to permit testimony about samples' comparative features, expert should also be permitted to testify to inferences to be drawn from those features -- here, that samples matched. District court did not abuse discretion.

United States v. Rivera-Rosario, 300 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002). FBI agent Carlos Cases testifies for prosecution at drug trial re meaning of code words in narcotics trade. Admissibility affirmed. Because defendant did not raise objection at trial, review is for plain error. Agent had substantial experience and training that qualified him to opine on narcotics code words. Nor did agent's dual role as expert and fact witness confuse jury. Agent explained when opinions were based on training and experience rather than investigation of this particular case.

United States v. Lopez-Lopez, 282 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 949 (2002). In drug conspiracy trial, INS agent testifies, based on experience in prior investigations, that drug importation operations use GPS to facilitate air drops and boat-to-boat transfers, and use cell phones to enable boat-to-ground communication. Admissibility affirmed. Agent's experience was sufficient basis for expert opinion under Kumho Tire, and testimony would be of assistance to average juror. Testimony's probative value outweighed any prejudicial effects, and agent was properly testifying as expert, so that restrictions on lay opinion testimony did not apply.

United States v. Sanchez-Alvarez, No. 00-1498 (1st Cir. Nov. 20, 2001) (unpublished). At sentencing phase of drug trial, U.S. Customs Agent Richard Roark testifies re meaning of encoded language used in recorded phone conversation between defendants. Affirmed. Defendant says testimony was inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 702, but that evidentiary rule does not apply during sentencing phase. Moreover, similar testimony has often been held admissible under Rule 702 even during trial. Testimony easily satisfied requirement, for sentencing purposes, that evidence possess sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.

United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1007 (2002). Charged with tax fraud, defendant objects when prosecution offers IRS agent James Donahue to offer lay opinion identifying handwriting as defendant's. District court admits testimony and jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. As defendant correctly points out, Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(2) governs testimony re handwriting identification, and provides that such identification may be proved by lay opinion only if witness's familiarity with handwriting was not acquired for purposes of litigation. Agent Donahue became familiar with defendant's handwriting during multiple IRS investigations over span of several years. Defendant says agent's familiarity was therefore "acquired for purposes of the litigation" within meaning of Rule 901(b)(2), and that agent's testimony could have been offered, if at all, only if agent had been qualified as expert, as he was not. However, agent's familiarity with defendant's handwriting was not acquired for trial, but rather over several years for investigative purposes. His testimony was therefore permissible lay opinion under Rule 901(b)(2).

United States v. Shea, 211 F.3d 658 (1st Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1134 (2001). Criminal defendants object to government expert's testimony matching DNA from defendants' blood samples to physical evidence from various crime scenes. Admissibility affirmed. Expert initially overlooked nonmatching allele dot in testing sweat residue from cap, but explained when queried that his findings would be unaltered given faint intensity of nonmatching allele dot. District court conducted Daubert inquiry and concluded that any defects in expert's methods went to weight, not admissibility. Most other circuits have agreed with this approach.

United States v. Corey, 207 F.3d 84 (1st Cir. 2000). Ex-con is found in Maine with Smith & Wesson shotgun and charged with possession by felon of firearm having traveled in interstate commerce. Smith & Wesson has manufacturing plants in Massachusetts, Ohio, and Maine. To prove that weapon traveled in interstate commerce, and was not manufactured in Maine, prosecution offers ATF agent who opines that weapon was made in Massachusetts. On voir dire and cross-examination, agent states that bases for his opinion includes telephone conversation with Smith & Wesson's resident historian, technical manuals from manufacturer, and notes and records maintained by agent and ATF reflecting information gathered over time re weapons manufacturing locations. Defendant objects that testimony is primarily reliant on information gleaned in telephone conversation with Smith & Wesson and is hearsay cloaked as expert opinion. District court overrules objection and defendant is convicted. Admissibility affirmed. Standard of review is deferential, ATF agent had extensive experience in area, and phone conversation with Smith & Wesson historian simply verified opinion already formed. Consultation of markings on gun is not prerequisite to testimony re origins, and even if it were, district court could conclude that agent did base testimony partly on markings on gun. Requiring production of underlying records consulted by agent would reinstate misguided "best evidence" notions that Fed. R. Evid. 703 was intended to relax. Moreover, district court arguably had discretion to conclude that telephone conversation was information of type reasonably relied on by experts in agent's field.

United States v. Torres-Galindo, 206 F.3d 136 (1st Cir. 2000). FBI agent testifies in criminal trial that based on his ten years of experience, it is common for suspects, prior to any confession, to begin by denying everything. Jury returns guilty verdict. Admissibility reversed. This walks and talks like expert testimony, and even assuming compliance with criminal discovery rules, it would not satisfy requirement that expert testimony be helpful to trier of fact, because testimony did not involve any matters beyond commonsense understanding of average juror. However, error was harmless, because agent was extensively cross-examined, and because other evidence of guilt was overwhelming.

United States v. Nektalov, No. 05-2780 (2d Cir. Aug. 25, 2006). Jury convicts defendant on money laundering charges after hearing testimony from prosecution experts [on modus operandi of money laundering operations?]. Admissibility affirmed. Testimony shed light on practices of objectives and practices of money launderers and was therefore helpful to trier of fact.

United States v. Carter, No. 05-2177 (2d Cir. Mar. 27, 2006) (unpublished). In armed robbery trial, FBI analyst James Smith testifies for prosecution that defendant's hat is same as hat shown in photograph of man attempting to withdraw money from ATM. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Analyst explained process he used to digitize and compare photos. He has testified as expert in previous trials, and defendant offers no basis for challenging analyst's qualifications.

United States v. Adeyi, No. 05-1722 (2d Cir. Feb. 7, 2006) (unpublished). Prosecution's handwriting expert testifies in drug trial that handwriting in defendant's address book matches handwriting found on heroin packages. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Because defendant did not object at trial, review is for plain error. Second Circuit has not ruled to date on whether handwriting experts may testify to authorship of handwriting samples, and so it cannot be said that trial court's ruling was plainly erroneous. Other circuits have approved testimony on matches.

United States v. Brown, No. 03-1542 (2d Cir. Oct. 18, 2005) (unpublished). In cocaine distribution trial, defendant objects when prosecution expert testifies that defendant's handwriting matches handwriting on certain documents. Trial court admits testimony and jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Defendant says expert should have been limited to noting similarities between handwriting on exemplar and other documents, without offering ultimate opinion on whether handwriting on documents matched defendant's. Other circuits have rejected similar arguments. District court, to which substantial deference is owed, did not abuse its discretion. Even if it had, any error would be harmless.

United States v. Barrow, 400 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2005). In narcotics prosecution, detective testifies as prosecution expert on methods employed by drug dealers at various levels of distribution chain. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Testimony was brief and was helpful to jury. Defendant complains that detective's dual role as fact witness and expert risked confusing jury, but her testimony in those respective capacities was clearly demarcated. No abuse of discretion.

United States v. Londono-Tabarez, No. 02-1558 (2d Cir. Jan. 12, 2005) (unpublished), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1962 (2005). DEA agent Todd Zimmerman testifies at narcotics trial to meaning of "drug code" and other language used in defendants' taped conversations. Jury convicts. Admissibility reversed in part. It is true, as defendant points out, that district court did not explicitly qualify agent as expert until halfway through his testimony. But that did not prejudice defendant, because district court eventually found that agent's participation in hundreds of narcotics investigations rendered him qualified. Trial court did err in permitting agent to interpret not only drug jargon but also ordinary expressions within average juror's understanding, such as "bring it up here" and "pain in the neck." But error was harmless.

United States v. Botero-Jaramillo, No. 02-1611 (2d Cir. Dec. 14, 2004) (unpublished). Jury convicts drug conspiracy defendant after FBI agent testifies to significance of documents found in defendant's bedroom. Admissibility affirmed. Defendant raised no objection at trial. Similar interpretive testimony by narcotics officers has been permitted in other cases, and agent's testimony was not at heart of prosecution's case. No plain error.

United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1878 (2005). Arrested while taking possession of 86-pound load of marijuana, defendant stipulates to trial testimony of prosecution's forensic chemist, who says she personally tested drug exhibits and found all to contain marijuana. Jury convicts. Affirmed. Defendant challenges foundation of chemist's opinion, but expert may testify to conclusions without first testifying to underlying facts or data. Parties may not stipulate to admissibility at trial and attempt to raise Daubert objections on appeal under guise of sufficiency challenges. In any event, expert testimony is not necessary to support conviction for possession of controlled substance.

United States v. Cruz, 363 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2004). DEA agent testifies at drug trial to meaning of "watching somebody's back" as used by defendant. Jury convicts. Admissibility reversed. Courts must be especially vigilant in their gatekeeping where prosecutors call law enforcement officers to testify both as fact witnesses and as experts in same trial. Prosecution did not show that defendant used phrase as drug jargon. DEA agent therefore strayed from his area of legitimate expertise. Moreover, prosecution's intention to offer expert testimony from DEA agent was not disclosed in pretrial discovery.

United States v. Bruce, No. 02-1730 (2d Cir. Sept. 26, 2003) (unpublished). Narcotics defendant objects when prosecution offers testimony from New York City police detective Richard Addona re narcotics couriers. District court admits testimony and jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Detective testified that legitimate travelers usually plan travel in advance, rather than purchasing tickets on day of travel with cash. Such testimony was helpful to jury and not unduly prejudicial.

United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 933 (2003). In trial re 1993 World Trade Center bombing, prosecution and defense both seek to offer expert testimony on chemical analysis of materials found at bombing site and at defendants' apartment and storage shed. District court directs parties to produce experts at pretrial Daubert hearing, on pain of having their testimony precluded at trial. Defendants initially object, urging trial judge to postpone Daubert hearing until trial itself, but defendants produce experts after trial judge refuses to defer hearing. Following hearing, defendants' experts are permitted to testify at trial. Jury convicts. Affirmed. Defendants say district court's pretrial procedures prejudiced them, but district courts enjoy wide procedural latitude in resolving Daubert issues, and no defense witnesses were precluded from testifying.

United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1092 (2004). Prosecution calls Special Agent Richard Biggs to testify concerning meaning of code words in recorded phone conversations about narcotics. Defendant objects that many portions of agent's testimony appear to represent inferences from agent's familiarity with specifics of this case, as opposed to general expertise in narcotics code words. Admissibility reversed. Problems arise when law enforcement agents assume dual roles of fact witness and expert -- e.g., potential jury confusion. "While we decline to prohibit categorically the use of case agents as experts," district courts should be especially vigilant to discharge their gatekeeping function in such contexts, and trial court erred here in admitting testimony straying beyond agent's expertise. However, error was harmless, because other evidence overwhelmingly supported conviction.

United States v. Glenn, 312 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2002). Eyewitness in murder trial testifies for prosecution that shortly after shooting, from distance of five or six houses, he observed bulge in clothing at defendant's waist, approximately two inches wide and four inches long. Eyewitness goes on to offer lay opinion, based on his general observations of drug dealers carrying weapons, that bulge was caused by handgun and could not have been caused by pager or some different item. Jury convicts. Admissibility reversed. Government's case was entirely circumstantial, and even crediting disputed testimony from eyewitness, no reasonable juror could have found that prosecution met its burden. But eyewitness's opinion testimony was inadmissible. Opinions based on claims to specialized knowledge must be offered by duly qualified experts, and this eyewitness neither possessed relevant qualifications nor based his conclusions on reliable or scientific methods, relying instead on his own intuitions formed from sporadic everyday observations performed over unspecified time period.

United States v. Carneglia, No. 01-1585 (2d Cir. Sept. 19, 2002) (unpublished). FBI agent Gregory Hagarty testifies at trial of organized crime figures re interpretation of recorded conversations involving defendants. Admissibility affirmed. Even if agent's interpretations sometimes extended beyond his expertise, his testimony comported with Second Circuit precedent, and any error was harmless.

United States v. Campuzano, No. 01-1261 (2d Cir. Aug. 16, 2002) (unpublished). DEA agent testifies for prosecution re use of code words in drug trade. Admissibility affirmed. Testimony was helpful to average juror, and its probative value was not outweighed by any prejudicial effect.

United States v. Hurtado, No. 00-1644 (2d Cir. June 10, 2002) (unpublished). At criminal trial, Dr. Stephan Rose testifies that customs dog's reaction to baggage indicated residual odor of either firearms or narcotics. Admissibility affirmed. Defendant did not object to testimony at trial, and expert testified at length to facts and methodology on which his testimony was based.

United States v. Andino, No. 00-1562 (2d Cir. Feb. 25, 2002) (unpublished). Counsel for criminal defendants do not raise Daubert challenge at trial level to government's expert testimony re weight of marijuana. Affirmed. No ineffective assistance, because counsel could reasonably have chosen to argue defendants' actual innocence rather than engage government in dispute over quantities of drugs.

United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 949 (2002). Defendants in Hobbs Act prosecution say they were simply members of labor coalition using time-honored labor tactics to increase minority hires by New York City contractors, but government says defendants extorted money and jobs without actually increasing minority representation. Prosecution calls Daniel O'Rourke, supervisor of police construction task force, who testifies that minority representation at work sites did not correlate with coalition activity at sites, and also that coalition members disrupted work, took kickbacks, made threats, and engaged in violence to get their way. Prosecution also calls James McNamara, who has worked in governmental positions focused on ensuring minority opportunity at construction sites, to testify that coalition's activities did not increase number of minority employees but merely resulted in substitution of coalition's members for other minority workers, who were fired to make way. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Defendants object that prosecution experts were merely used as vehicles for hearsay testimony that could and should have been offered by fact witnesses, and also complain that district court conducted no reliability inquiry before admitting their testimony. But experts provided helpful explanations of labor coalition practices falling outside general knowledge of average juror, and permissibly based opinions on sources customarily consulted by "expert police officers," such as statements by detectives and informants. Nor must district court make explicit findings on reliability. Appellate court must "assume that the district court consistently and continually performed a trustworthiness analysis sub silentio of all evidence introduced at trial."

United States v. Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 943 (2001). Probationary member of Los Solidos gang complies with leader's order to shoot and kill another gang member. At shooter's RICO trial, prosecutors offer expert testimony from FBI agent Jeff Rovelli, who opines over defendant's objection that Los Solidos gang was involved in narcotics trafficking. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Defendant complains that agent's testimony went to ultimate issue of whether defendant's conduct furthered "racketeering activity," but agent did not use those words, and in any event, not all testimony on ultimate issues is prohibited. Defendant also urges that challenged testimony went beyond agent's expertise and relied on hearsay and other sources not in evidence. But experts may sometimes rely on hearsay. It is true that agent also testified as fact witness, and that lines between his factual and expert testimony were not always clear. But defense counsel were free to explore such issues on cross-examination, and did so. No abuse of discretion.

United States v. Rivera, No. 99-1678 (2d Cir. Mar. 28, 2000) (unpublished). Law enforcement officer testifies for prosecution that quantity of drugs possessed by defendant was consistent with intent to distribute, as opposed to personal use. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Law enforcement agents may rely on field experience rather than scientific training in testifying to such matters, and witness did not impermissibly opine on defendant's intent.

United States v. Adams, No. 03-2108 (3d Cir. July 10, 2006) (unpublished). STR/PCR DNA evidence is admitted at bank robbery trial over defendants' objection. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Reliability of DNA evidence was previously upheld in United States v. Trala, 386 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 2004) [see infra].

United States v. Hurst, No. 05-2443 (3d Cir. June 20, 2006) (unpublished). Detective offers expert testimony for government in prosecution under Motor Vehicle Theft Deterrent Act. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Defendant complains that detective followed no discernible methodology, but detective's experience afforded sufficient basis for his testimony.

United States v. Reynolds, No. 04-3183 (3d Cir. Mar. 27, 2006) (unpublished). In drug conspiracy trial, agent Ken Bellis gives expert testimony on role of shootings and firearms in narcotics trafficking. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Defendant argues that testimony did not assist trier of fact, and indeed was prejudicial, since there was no evidence linking defendant to firearms or violence. But statements about firearms and violence were not central to agent's testimony, and were not prejudicial in context of general discussion of drug operations. District court reasonably concluded that evidence would aid jury in understanding nature of conspiracy alleged by government.

United States v. Patterson, No. 04-3380 (3d Cir. Mar. 14, 2006) (unpublished). Special agent Anthony Tropea testifies in narcotics trial re use of telephones in narcotics trafficking operations. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Agent had fourteen years of experience. This kind of testimony is routine. No abuse of discretion.

United States v. Mornan, 413 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2005). Handwriting expert testifying for prosecution says she "thinks" her opinions rise to level of reasonable degree of scientific certainty. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Defendant raised no objection below and so review is for plain error. Defendant now says expert's claim of "reasonable scientific certainty" was too half-hearted to support her testimony's admissibility under Daubert, but handwriting experts may legitimately offer opinions grounded on mere probabilities and need not invoke talismanic language.

United States v. Berry, No. 03-2803 (3d Cir. June 2, 2005) (unpublished), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 668 (2005). Detective testifies to meaning of drug code words in narcotics trial. Jury convicts and defendant appeals. Admissibility affirmed. Detective had ample training and experience. No abuse of discretion.

United States v. Dien Vy Phung, No. 03-4544 (3d Cir. Apr. 13, 2005) (unpublished). Defendant is arrested in connection with sale of approximately 7560 pills of methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA or "Ecstasy"). To estimate total weight of MDMA for sentencing purposes, prosecution offers testimony from DEA chemist Jennifer Espinosa. Defendant moves to exclude her testimony on theory that chemist employed unreliable sampling method. District court overrules objection after declining defendant's request for Daubert hearing. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Sampling procedure was designed and approved by DEA statistical department and appears to be standard procedure in law enforcement forensic departments. Defendant's position would not have been advanced by convening Daubert hearing.

United States v. Davis, 397 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2005). In response to hypothetical questions, police officer opines that circumstances of defendants' arrest were consistent with drug trafficking. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Officer had extensive experience as narcotics officer, and his knowledge was not within ken of average juror. Nor did he offer impermissible testimony about defendants' state of mind or intent. Prosecution's noncompliance with discovery requirements was harmless.

United States v. Trala, 386 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 126 S. Ct. 1078 (2006). Trial court overrules objection by bank robbery defendant to testimony from prosecution's expert matching defendant's DNA to samples from sweatshirt and knit cap left near crime scene. Jury convicts and defendant appeals. Admissibility affirmed. Trial judge upheld reliability of PCR/STR DNA typing after painstaking and thorough analysis. No abuse of discretion.

United States v. Rutland, 372 F.3d 543 (3d Cir. 2004). Handwriting expert Gus Lesnevich testifies for prosecution that signatures on key documents in fraud scheme are forgeries, over defendant's objection that jury will be prejudicially swayed if expert with such extraordinary qualifications is permitted to testify to ultimate issues. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Juries may properly consider expert's impressive qualifications in evaluating testimony. Forbidding especially well-qualified experts from opining on ultimate issues would lead to absurd results, by incentivizing litigants to search out less qualified experts.

United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 974 (2004). Prosecution proposes to offer trial testimony from FBI fingerprint examiner Wilbur Johnson, who opines that two latent prints from vehicle match defendant's thumbprints, and from FBI special agent Steven Meagher, who opines to same effect and also re underlying forensic theories on which practice of fingerprint identification is based. Defendant seeks to offer expert opinions from thirteen officials at state agencies who were initially unable to identify one or both latent prints as belonging to defendant: John Otis (Maine); Janice Williams and Michael McSparrin (Mississippi); Ralph Turbyfill (Arkansas); Donald Lock (Missouri); Russell McNatt, Jr. (Delaware); Raymond York (Idaho); John Artz (Nevada); Janice Reeves (Louisiana); and Richard Higgins, Edward Pelton, Robert McAuley, and James Ruszas (New York). In addition, defense seeks to offer three experts to testify generally, on various grounds, that fingerprint identification is unscientific: Dr. David Stoney, director of forensic teaching and research institute; James Starrs, professor of law and forensic science; and Dr. Simon Cole, post-doctoral fellow with expertise in science and technology studies. To evaluate admissibility of each side's proposed testimony, district court holds five-day Daubert hearing, generating approximately 1000 pages of transcript. District court rules testimony from prosecution's experts to be reliable and admissible. District court further rules that defense experts may challenge specific identifications of defendant's prints and point to methodological defects of fingerprint identification in general, but may not testify that fingerprint identification is not scientific. Jury convicts and defendant appeals. Admissibility affirmed; exclusions affirmed. Fingerprint identification satisfies standards for reliability established in Daubert and Kumho Tire. "[T]his case does not announce a categorical rule that latent fingerprint identification evidence is admissible in this Circuit, though we trust that the foregoing [extensive] discussion provides strong guidance." District court properly excluded trial testimony on whether fingerprint evidence is scientific because such testimony would not assist trier of fact.

United States v. Katzin, No. 02-2407 (3d Cir. Apr. 19, 2004) (unpublished). Over defendant's objection, law enforcement agent testifies at trial as expert on drug jargon. Admissibility affirmed. Defendant protests that prosecution supplied no pretrial report from expert, but government did provide 469-page affidavit in which his testimony was explained. Defendant also says expert was unqualified, but defendant raised no such objection at trial, and district court legitimately approved agent's qualifications after extensive voir dire.

United States v. Bennett, No. 01-3412 (3d Cir. Aug. 29, 2003) (unpublished). On trial for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, defendants object when prosecution offers expert testimony from narcotics agent Kenneth Bellis re drug jargon and meaning of "breakfast" and "lunch" as used by defendants in recorded phone conversations. District court overrules objection and jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Although it may be close question whether agent's testimony crossed into areas unhelpful to trier of fact, any error was harmless given other evidence of guilt.

Jacobs v. Virgin Islands, No. 02-1135 (3d Cir. Dec. 12, 2002) (unpublished). Trial court dismisses criminal proceedings after defendant successfully moves to exclude prosecution's fingerprint expert under Daubert. Exclusion affirmed. Proponent bears burden of establishing that expert's testimony satisfies Daubert. Nothing in record indicates that fingerprint expert in this case used unreliable methods, but neither does record afford sufficient grounds for reversing district court's discretionary exclusion of testimony.

United States v. Davis, No. 00-3536 (3d Cir. July 26, 2002) (unpublished), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 989 (2002). District court permits postal inspectors to testify as "lay experts" that videotapes contained child pornography. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Expert opinion may be necessary to judge age in close cases, but lay opinion on age is generally competent. Moreover, this case was tried prior to amendment of Fed. R. Evid. 701 in 2000, which barred lay opinion testimony falling within Rule 702's ambit. Because witnesses possessed pertinent specialized knowledge, testimony was admissible "regardless of whether we view that testimony as lay opinion testimony akin to that of an expert or merely lay opinion testimony based on ordinary human experience."

United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 859 (2002). At drug conspiracy trial, government expert testifies that drug trafficking organizations often rely on cell phones and pagers to avoid detection of their location by law enforcement officers. Admissibility affirmed. Defendants do not challenge witness's expertise, but contend that testimony would not fall outside knowledge of average juror, and was prejudicial. But it is not common knowledge that police are unable simultaneously to wiretap cellular calls and keep caller under surveillance, or that pagers are used by drug traffickers to transmit numerically coded messages. Testimony therefore satisfies requirement of being helpful to trier of fact, and district court did not abuse discretion in refusing to exclude testimony as unduly prejudicial.

United States v. Lopez, 271 F.3d 472 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 908 (2002). When prosecution calls FBI fingerprint expert at trial, defense objects that only expert's conclusions were disclosed during discovery, not his "bases and reasons" therefor, and not his qualifications. Trial court admits testimony because defense waited until trial to raise objection and did not fulfill its "obligation to ask for a Daubert hearing." Admissibility affirmed. Assuming without deciding that prosecution's nondisclosures violated discovery provisions of Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a), defendant has shown no prejudice.

United States v. Watson, 260 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2001). In narcotics trial, three law enforcement officers testify as experts for prosecution over defendant's objections. Admissibility affirmed. Because no Rule 702 objection was raised, review of testimony's admissibility under Rule 702 is for plain error. It is common and permissible for law enforcement personnel to offer expert testimony on modus operandi of illegal drug operations, and district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting such testimony here. However, in opining that defendant possessed intent to distribute, witnesses ran afoul of Fed. R. Evid. 704(b), and so conviction must be reversed.

United States v. Villarreal, No. 05-4206 (4th Cir. June 14, 2006) (unpublished). Jury convicts narcotics defendant after prosecution offers expert testimony from law enforcement officer re manner in which drug dealers record transactions. Admissibility affirmed. No abuse of discretion.

United States v. Ferguson, No. 05-4243 (4th Cir. Mar. 28, 2006) (unpublished). District court permits DEA agent to testify for prosecution re local drug trade. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Such testimony was relevant and could assist jury. Similar testimony is routinely held admissible. No abuse of discretion.

United States v. Batts, No. 04-5048 (4th Cir. Mar. 21, 2006) (unpublished). In narcotics conspiracy trial, prosecution offers expert testimony from FBI agent John Lanata on drug gangs. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. No abuse of discretion.

United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 2006). Prosecution calls lab technician Carrie Kirkpatrick to testify that substance found in defendant's possession was cocaine base. Defendant objects to qualifying her as expert, but trial court states that designating her as lay or expert witness is less important than substance of her testimony, which trial court finds to be reliable. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Defendant complains that witness was unable, on cross-examination, to state error rate for lab test or to identify type of chemical reaction involved. But trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding those issues went to weight, not admissibility. Witness did testify that her test methods were generally accepted and subject to quality controls.

United States v. Williams, No. 05-4977 (4th Cir. Feb. 17, 2006) (unpublished). In parole revocation proceedings, government relies on expert opinion from probation officer John Grant on how long marijuana remains detectable in human body. District court revokes supervised release. Admissibility affirmed. Witness had substantial training and experience.

United States v. Forrest, 429 F.3d 73 (4th Cir. 2005). Police chief Ronald Forrest meets young adolescent boy who assists Forrest in founding department's "Junior Police Program." Boy begins visiting Forrest's home and sleeping over. Forrest pays boy to pose for naked pictures. Forrest's fiancée finds pictures in Forrest's photo album and reports Forrest. At Forrest's trial on charges of sexual exploitation of child, prosecution offers testimony of Kenneth Lanning (former FBI agent with extensive experience in child abuse issues). Over Forrest's objection, Lanning describes general profile of child molesters that closely resembles Forrest's behavior (molesters are often authority figures, like police officers; they often have their victims spend the night and take their pictures; they are often apprehended only after someone else finds pictures). Jury convicts. Affirmed. Admission of Lanning's testimony is troubling, given that Forrest was not on trial for child molestation. But its admissibility need not be reached, because any error was harmless, given overwhelming evidence of Forrest's guilt.

United States v. Smith, No. 04-4248 (4th Cir. Nov. 3, 2005) (unpublished), cert. denied, ___ S. Ct. ___ (2006). Defendant is prosecuted on various firearms charges. Over defendant's objection, trial court admits testimony from ATF document examiner Carl McClary, who testifies that defendant's handwriting samples match signatures on forms completed at pawn shop to purchase handguns. Trial court also admits testimony from ATF agent Don Baucom, who opines that handguns traveled in interstate commerce. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Fourth Circuit has previously upheld handwriting analysis against Daubert challenge, and this defendant offered no evidence calling its reliability into question. Defendant says Baucom is unqualified, but district court did not abuse discretion in admitting testimony from ATF agent with extensive experience who has received advanced interstate nexus training.

United States v. McElveen, No. 04-4285 (4th Cir. Apr. 15, 2005) (unpublished), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 298 (2005). DEA agent testifies in narcotics trial re nature of local drug trade. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Such testimony is routinely held admissible.

United States v. Ricketts, No. 03-4721 (4th Cir. Dec. 9, 2004) (unpublished), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 841 (2005). Trial court excludes testimony from criminal defendant's voice spectography expert. Exclusion affirmed. Testimony was without probative value to jury because it did not tend to make any fact of consequence more probable or less so.

United States v. Benitez, No. 03-4628 (4th Cir. Apr. 6, 2004) (unpublished). Criminal defendant appeals conviction, alleging district court improperly admitted expert evidence. Admissibility affirmed. No abuse of discretion.

United States v. Gwynn, No. 03-4293 (4th Cir. Dec. 11, 2003) (unpublished), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1018 (2004). Defendant is convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute after jury hears expert testimony from Detective Peter Sullivan on modus operandi of drug dealers. Admissibility affirmed. Similar testimony has been held admissible before, and district court did not abuse its discretion. Expert boasts seventeen years' experience in Baltimore police department.

United States v. Epps, No. 03-4234 (4th Cir. Sept. 26, 2003) (unpublished), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1053 (2004). Government agent testifies as expert for prosecution re narcotics trafficking generally and relation of firearms thereto. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. This is standard fare, and assisted jury by dispelling misconceptions and explaining how particular type of firearm would aid drug dealer. Agent explained basis for his testimony. No abuse of discretion.

United States v. Winston, No. 02-4939 (4th Cir. June 16, 2003) (unpublished). Criminal defendant charged with illegal possession of firearm following conviction of felony objects when ATF agent testifies re manufacture of firearms. District court admits testimony and jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Agent's qualifications were established and testimony was not hearsay.

United States v. Brown, No. 02-4250 (4th Cir. Apr. 21, 2003) (unpublished), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 901 (2003). Native of Ghana is charged with knowingly entering United States on forged visa. At trial, prosecution calls: (1) expert Christopher Misciagno, who testifies that characteristics of defendant's altered visa are consistent with type of visa fraud prevalent in Ghana in 2001; and (2) INS inspector William Allen, who testifies as lay witness that defendant appeared nervous when interviewed and exhibited behaviors that Allen has been trained to recognize as those of someone who is not being completely honest. Jury convicts. Affirmed. Defendant argues that expert Misciagno's testimony was more prejudicial than probative, because Misciagno effectively opined on ultimate issue of defendant's guilt. But defendant did not preserve this point for appeal through adequate objection at trial. Defendant is correct that district court should not have permitted INS inspector to offer lay opinion on defendant's veracity, because credibility is for jury to decide, but error was harmless, because rational jury could have concluded for itself, from inspector's testimony re defendant's nervousness, that defendant was dissembling.

United States v. Barnett, No. 02-4561 (4th Cir. Apr. 11, 2003) (unpublished), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 914 (2003). Special Agent Matthew Carbone testifies at criminal trial re use of expressions "sweet potato joints" and "cabaret" as code words in drug trade. Admissibility affirmed. Numerous courts have upheld similar testimony in drug trafficking cases, and agent had extensive experience in narcotics investigations.

United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 888 (2003). In bank robbery prosecution, government fingerprint expert Katherine Brannan testifies to finding defendant's latent print on inculpatory note, and document analyst Thomas Currin opines that defendant authored note. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Defendant says scientific validation of fingerprinting is weak, and points out that no study has shown individual human fingerprints to be unique. But no study has shown otherwise either, and technique has long enjoyed general acceptance in forensic community. Moreover, fingerprint evidence has been employed in court since 1911. Standards governing technique's application do exist, and other courts have credited testimony that error rate is low. Further research would be welcome, but meanwhile, to bar use of this bedrock forensic identifier is unwarranted. Cross-examination can test foundations and reliability of testimony from fingerprint experts. Defendant attacks handwriting analysis on similar grounds, which fail for similar reasons. Dissent: General acceptance of these techniques prevails only among their practitioners, and scientific support for them is otherwise unimpressive. Admitting testimony was abuse of discretion.

United States v. Jackson, 327 F.3d 273 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1019 (2003). Man abducts, tortures, rapes, and kills woman. Stun gun is found among defendant's possessions. At trial, prosecution offers Dr. Richard Stratbucker, who opines that multiple stun-gun marks were found on woman's body. Trial court admits testimony over defendant's objection, and jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Expert's opinion was supported by his qualifications and previous research on physiological effects of stun guns on human body.

United States v. Jones, No. 02-4672 (4th Cir. Feb. 25, 2003) (unpublished), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 949 (2003). On trial for possession of firearm by felon, defendant objects to testimony from prosecution expert re likelihood of obtaining fingerprints from firearm. District court admits testimony and jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Government expert possessed sufficient specialized knowledge.

United States v. Mohr, 318 F.3d 613 (4th Cir. 2003). In trial of K-9 officer for violating arrestees' civil rights through use of excessive force, government offers testimony from retired police officer and professor of criminal justice, James Fyfe, who opines that officer's release of police dog was unnecessary and violated prevailing police standards. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Testimony was helpful to trier of fact.

United States v. Smallwood, No. 02-4634 (4th Cir. Jan. 15, 2003) (unpublished), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1048 (2003). Defendant is convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute after district court admits expert testimony from detective re general characteristics of drug trade. Admissibility affirmed. District court did not abuse discretion.

United States v. Hopkins, 310 F.3d 145 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1238 (2003). After high-speed chase, defendant is apprehended with semi-automatic pistol, loose ammunition, police scanner radio, pager, digital scale, currency, and 34 baggies containing cocaine base. At trial on charges including possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, prosecution offers police officer Lawrence Phillips to testify as expert re narcotics trafficking. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Officer had extensive training and experience, and explained how defendant's possession of relevant items was consistent with narcotics trafficking.

United States v. Lysaith, No. 01-4911 (4th Cir. Oct. 16, 2002) (unpublished). Defendant in drug trial objects to testimony of forensic chemist Sarah Chenowith that substance sold by defendant was crack cocaine. District court admits testimony and jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Expert had bachelor's degree in chemistry, completed five month training course with police department, and also received training from DEA. Defendant complains that expert had no specific course work in analysis of controlled substances. But expert had conducted 600 such analyses for police department and testified as expert witness 22 times. District court did not abuse discretion in qualifying her as expert.

United States v. Desper, No. 01-4772 (4th Cir. Apr. 8, 2002) (unpublished). Prosecution offers law enforcement officer's testimony re modus operandi of drug dealers. Admissibility affirmed. This is standard fare.

United States v. Ware, No. 00-4733 (4th Cir. Jan. 15, 2002) (unpublished), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1073 (2002). Law enforcement officer testifies to meaning of drug code words used by criminal defendant in taped conversation. Admissibility affirmed. No abuse of discretion.

United States v. Rogers, No. 01-4455 (4th Cir. Dec. 20, 2001) (unpublished), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 2041 (2002). Criminal defendant objects to testimony from two Secret Service agents that latent print matched exemplar supplied by defendant. Admissibility affirmed. Defendant contends it is untested and unproven that all fingerprints are unique, but government cited numerous studies supporting contrary view, and defendant offered no evidence that fingerprinting is unreliable. To extent that fingerprint matching involves subjective judgment, possibility of error was mitigated by having two experts examine prints. Defendant contends that no uniform standards govern fingerprint matching, but in fact such standards are supplied by training, peer review, and double checking. Agents here found seven corresponding characteristics between two thumbprint samples, which is adequate to meet modern criteria. Moreover, every circuit addressing issue, both before and after Daubert, has held fingerprint evidence admissible, and many courts have even refused to conduct evidentiary hearings on this issue. In any event, any error would be harmless, as evidence against defendant was overwhelming.

United States v. Wright, No. 01-4270 (4th Cir. Dec. 11, 2001) (unpublished). Detective testifies for prosecution as expert re drug trafficking patterns and practices. Admissibility affirmed. This type of testimony is routinely upheld, and expert possessed substantial experience.

United States v. Johnson, No. 01-4011 (4th Cir. Nov. 16, 2001) (unpublished). Defendant in drug trial offers expert in narcotics investigations to rebut informant's understanding of tape-recorded conversations with defendant. District court excludes testimony. Jury convicts. Exclusion affirmed. Because defendant cross-examined government witnesses on these issues and testified to his own understanding of phone conversation, district court properly found that defendant's expert would not assist trier of fact. No abuse of discretion.

Powell v. Wilborn, No. 00-2086 (4th Cir. Apr. 25, 2001) (unpublished). Man on receiving end of pepper spray sues police under section 1983, alleging excessive use of force during traffic arrest. He alleges his behavior was compliant and passive; police allege he resisted arrest. Police offer forensic pathologist's testimony re driver's blood alcohol level and its potential effects on behavior. Driver objects, on grounds that testimony is not relevant under Daubert and also because forensic pathologist is not an MD. Admissibility affirmed. No abuse of discretion.

United States v. Lightfoot, No. 00-4357 (4th Cir. Mar. 28, 2001) (unpublished). FBI agent testifies to similarity between articles seized from getaway vehicle and items in video images from bank surveillance system showing articles worn or used by robber. Admissibility affirmed. Defendant argues testimony did not involve judgments that laypersons were unable to make and was therefore unhelpful to jury. But trial court properly admitted testimony of agent as expert testimony under Daubert after extensive voir dire established its scientific reliability and relevance.

United States v. Hadden, No. 99-4503 (4th Cir. July 18, 2000) (unpublished), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1201 (2001). Charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, defendant offers testimony from expert on police practices, who opines that defendant's arrest in reverse sting operation was premature. District court excludes testimony and jury convicts. Exclusion affirmed. Testimony would not have assisted jury in determining any fact in issue.

United States v. Jones, No. 99-4413 (4th Cir. Feb. 22, 2000) (unpublished). Prosecution offers testimony from law enforcement agent on mode and operation of drug dealing. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. No abuse of discretion.

United States v. Garza, 448 F.3d 294 (5th Cir. 2006). Defendant in meth trial offers forensic document examiner Linda James to testify that signature of witness on defendant's confession and consent to search does not match known exemplars. District court excludes testimony and jury convicts. Exclusion affirmed. Expert admitted that examining original documents would be best practice, that she examined only copies, and that she did not know how many times they had been recopied. No abuse of discretion.

United States v. Mojica, No. 04-10802 (5th Cir. Dec. 7, 2005) (unpublished). Narcotics agent testifies in drug prosecution that "tamales" was used as code word for drugs, as opposed to money. Jury convicts. Admissibility reversed. Law enforcement agents may testify on drug jargon, but their opinions must be based on sufficient facts or data. Because there appears to have been little or no support for agent's testimony, district court may have abused its discretion in admitting it. But any error was harmless.

United States v. Hernandez-Rodarte, 04-40887 (5th Cir. June 23, 2005) (unpublished). Criminal defendant raises no objection at trial to government's fingerprint identification testimony. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. No plain error.

United States v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1022 (2006). Defendant is charged with possession of firearm and ammunition while subject to domestic restraining order. Prosecution offers testimony from ballistics expert John Beene, who opines that shell casings found in field were fired from rifle found on defendant's premises. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Trial court permissibly found witness to be qualified based on his extensive experience. Defendant complains that witness could not say whether technique he employed had been tested, was validated in peer-reviewed literature, had been studied for error rate, or was subject to objective standards. But witness testified that he relied on authoritative literature from the Association of Firearm and Tool Mark Examiners, and that he followed well-accepted procedures whose error rate approaches zero. No abuse of discretion.

United States v. Ashlock, No. 03-10615 (5th Cir. Aug. 3, 2004) (unpublished), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1136 (2005). Prosecution in narcotics case presents three forensic experts who testify regarding chemical identity of substances seized from defendant's person and residences, over defendant's objection that experts have not disclosed what testing protocols they followed. District judge overrules objection and jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Under Fed. R. Evid. 702, experts are not required to disclose their protocols in such detail as defendant contends. Proponent is required only to show by preponderance of evidence that testimony is admissible. Prosecution satisfied that requirement here through evidence that: (1) each expert held bachelor's degree in chemistry and had extensive on-the-job training in forensic chemistry; (2) each test performed by experts was generally accepted in field of forensic chemistry; (3) each test was performed in accordance with standard laboratory procedures; and (4) each expert had his or her results reviewed by another chemist. No abuse of discretion.

United States v. Wright, No. 03-20426 (5th Cir. Feb. 16, 2004) (unpublished). On trial for making false statements to FBI, offers Dr. Walter Quijano to testify re interrogation techniques employed in defendant's initial confession. District court excludes testimony and jury convicts. Exclusion affirmed. Circumstances of defendant's initial confession were never presented to jury, and so expert's testimony failed Daubert's relevancy prong. Defendant also objects for first time on appeal that FBI agent gave testimony beyond scope of his expertise, but given overwhelming evidence against defendant, there was no plain error.

United States v. Williams, 343 F.3d 423 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1093 (2003). Sheriff shoots unarmed suspect in back and is charged with criminal violation of federal civil rights laws. Prosecution offers testimony from three eyewitness law enforcement officers who opine that shooting was unreasonable. Jury convicts and defendant appeals. Affirmed. Although testimony from officers was offered as lay opinion, sheriff argues it should be treated as expert testimony because based on specialized knowledge, in which case testimony is inadmissible, sheriff says, because experts may not opine on defendant's state of mind under Fed. R. Evid. 704(b). Sheriff did not raise this objection at trial, and so review is for plain error. Sheriff's Rule 704(b) argument is unavailing, because even if testimony is treated as expert evidence, opinion on reasonableness of shooting does not relate to sheriff's state of mind. True, admission of testimony was error under Rule 704(a), which bars testimony offering legal conclusions, but that error was harmless, because other evidence against sheriff was overwhelming.

United States v. Ramos, No. 01-21250 (5th Cir. Aug. 4, 2003) (unpublished). Criminal defendant offers expert to testify that voice on inculpatory audiotape was not defendant's. District court excludes testimony and jury convicts. Exclusion affirmed. Defendant did not establish that expert's testimony satisfied Daubert's requirements. Even if exclusion of testimony were erroneous, it would have been harmless error, because other tapes undisputedly containing defendant's voice represented overwhelming evidence of guilt.

United States v. Green, 324 F.3d 375 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 823 (2003). At defendant's trial for drug-related offenses, prosecution offers expert testimony on drug trafficking and money laundering from DEA agents Mark Lusco and Rudy Babin. District court admits testimony and jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Defendant argues that experts' testimony should have been excluded for bias, because agents also participated in factual investigation of case. Because this theory is raised only on appeal, district court's decision admitting testimony is reviewed only for plain error. Agents who participated in investigation are not thereby barred from testifying as experts. Defendant was free to attack agents' credibility on cross-examination, and did attack it in closing argument.

United States v. Gutierrez-Farias, 294 F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1114 (2003). Man arrives at border in pickup, pulling tractor on flatbed trailer. Border Patrol finds 309 pounds of marijuana in tractor tires. At trial, DEA agent Robert Afanasewicz testifies as prosecution expert on drug smuggling, opining that persons found crossing borders with drugs in hidden compartments of vehicles generally know that drugs are there. Jury convicts. Admissibility reversed. Rather than offering specialized knowledge to assist jurors in understanding facts of case, agent's testimony amounted to simple generalization. Agent's opinion invited jurors to conclude that because persons in defendant's position are usually aware of their possession of drugs, defendant must have been aware himself. Not only did this constitute forbidden opinion testimony on ultimate issue in case, but it was also expert testimony on mens rea in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 704(b). But error was harmless in light of other evidence supporting conviction.

United States v. Wise, 221 F.3d 140 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 959 (2001). Members of organization seeking to liberate Texas from federal influence are tried, by feds, for conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction. Prosecution calls FBI agent who explains why botulism, rabies, and HIV fall within statutory definition of "biological agent." Admissibility affirmed. Agent was Biology Program Manager in Hazardous Materials Response Unit within FBI, held Ph.D. in human genetics, had done post-doctoral work on viral replication at Harvard Medical School, and had authored eleven or twelve relevant publications. His testimony that relevant toxins were "biological agents" pertained to scientific knowledge and satisfied Daubert. Defendants' contrary arguments are meritless. Moreover, even if this testimony were inadmissible, district court's failure to exclude it would be harmless error.

United States v. Drones, 218 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1151 (2001). District court grants habeas relief on theory that defendant's counsel afforded inadequate assistance in not pursuing expert voice spectrography evidence to show that voice on tape was not defendant's. Reversed. Defendant's own expert in habeas proceedings testified that voice spectrography analysis did not rest on proven theoretical basis, and no federal decision post-dating Daubert has addressed admissibility of voice spectrography analysis (nor is that question reached here). Given state of law at time of trial, it would be speculative to say that counsel's failure to pursue such evidence resulted in exclusion of admissible evidence. In any event, defendant cannot show prejudice, because other strong circumstantial evidence pointed to conviction.

United States v. Norris, 217 F.3d 262 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 870 (2001). Lawyer moves $500k from firm money market accounts to his personal account. Partners sue lawyer in state court. Lawyer then withdraws money from personal account and places it in safe deposit box. Partners obtain judgment in state case. Lawyer then removes money from safe deposit box. Partners attempt to execute on state judgment. Lawyer then says he "spent" money. Partners bring involuntary bankruptcy proceeding. Lawyer then testifies in bankruptcy case that in fact he poured gasoline on money and burned it in waste receptacle at his residence. Bankruptcy court disbelieves lawyer's story and orders money produced. Lawyer refuses. Bankruptcy court holds lawyer in civil contempt, ordering that he be incarcerated until he discloses location of money. Lawyer refuses and remains incarcerated until indicted for perjury. At perjury trial, prosecution offers testimony from ATF agent who attempted to recreate lawyer's alleged currency conflagration. Admissibility affirmed. Trial court erroneously asserted that Daubert was inapplicable, but in substance district court conducted reliability analysis and permissibly found that conditions of recreation, although not necessarily identical in every respect to bonfire that lawyer claims he set, were sufficiently similar to warrant admissibility.

United States v. Lopez-Medina, No. 05-5891 (6th Cir. Aug. 25, 2006). At narcotics trial, two DEA agents testify as fact witnesses and also as experts re common practices of narcotic traffickers. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Defendant's reliability objections are unavailing; both agents had years of training and experience. Defendant also objects, however, that no clear distinction was drawn at trial between lay and expert components of their testimony, nor any cautionary instruction issued. This was clear error, and it was not harmless. Remanded for new trial.

United States v. Whitmore, No. 05-6331 (6th Cir. Aug. 25, 2006) (unpublished). At sentencing phase, police officer testifies over defendant's objection that marijuana packaged in small baggies suggests possession with intent to distribute. Admissibility affirmed. Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply at sentencing phase. In any event, testimony from narcotics officers on modus operandi of drug dealers is generally held to be reliable.

United States v. Nichols, No. 04-4186 (6th Cir. July 6, 2006) (unpublished). Jury convicts narcotics defendant after police officers testify as experts re methods of drug dealers. Admissibility affirmed. Defendant says officers were too inexperienced to testify as experts. But officers had been trained in narcotics and served in special narcotics unit. Both had over two years' experience on job, and both had investigated 60-80 cases.

United States v. Swafford, 385 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1169 (2005). In narcotics possession trial, DEA agent Frank Ledford testifies for prosecution that firearm found at defendant's premises is indicative of intent to distribute. Detective Jimmy Smith also testifies for prosecution that dollar amounts written on business card correspond to cost for certain quantities of methamphetamine. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. No objection was raised below and so review is for plain error. No abuse of discretion.

United States v. Bugg, No. 03-5556 (6th Cir. June 29, 2004) (unpublished), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 975 (2004). ATF agent testifies for prosecution about difficulty of lifting fingerprints from firearms. Admissibility affirmed. Defendant says agent was unqualified because he lacked training in fingerprint analysis. However, agent did not testify on fingerprint analysis, but on difficulty of obtaining fingerprints from weapons. On that subject, he was qualified.

United States v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 2004). In drug trafficking trial, Kentucky police officer Dan Smoot testifies for prosecution on modus operandi of drug dealers. Admissibility affirmed. Officer did not testify directly on subject of defendant's intent to distribute narcotics, as would be prohibited by Fed. R. Evid. 704(b). Rather, officer testified to conduct consistent with intent, leaving it to jury to infer intent. No abuse of discretion.

United States v. Thomas, No. 02-5078 (6th Cir. May 21, 2004) (unpublished). Experienced DEA agent Jack Sparks testifies that 47 pounds of marijuana in defendant's possession is quantity consistent with commercial distribution, not personal use. Agent also testifies to general use by drug dealers of high capacity weapons, cellular phones, pagers, and commercial vehicles. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Law enforcement testimony on modus operandi of drug dealers is routinely admitted. No abuse of discretion.

United States v. Beverly, 369 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2004)369 F.3d 516 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 910 (2004). District court overrules bank robbery defendant's objections to expert testimony from "Dr. Melton" on mitochondrial deoxyribonucleic acid (mtDNA) identification, and jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. It is true that mtDNA is less precise identifier than nuclear DNA, but basic methodology is similar, other courts have upheld mtDNA identification, and it enjoys general acceptance. Defendant complains that lab was not accredited, but there is no evidentiary requirement for lab's certification by external agency, and expert is well-credentialed. Defendant also says expert's procedures allowed room for contamination, but no evidence suggested contamination of sample in this case. District court did not abuse discretion in permitting statistical testimony that less than one per cent of population would have same mtDNA pattern as hair recovered from bank robbery site, or in ruling that testimony's probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

United States v. Demjanjuk, 367 F.3d 623 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 970 (2004). In denaturalization proceedings, government offers expert testimony from "Dr. Sydnor" to support identification of defendant. District court admits testimony in bench trial and enters judgment revoking defendant's citizenship. Admissibility affirmed. Defendant complains that district court failed to discharge its gatekeeping function because it did not evaluate reliability of expert's "archival search methodology." But district court did not abuse discretion in admitting testimony, given its colloquy with defense counsel stating that trial court would consider defendant's objections in evaluating testimony's weight.

United States v. Donald, No. 02-6369 (6th Cir. Feb. 6, 2004) (unpublished), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1054 (2004). Man robs bank and leaves, but not before being captured on security videotape. When police arrive at bank, witnesses give description of perpetrator. Leaving bank to canvass neighborhood, police interview manager of nearby apartment building to inquire whether she has seen someone meeting witnesses' description. Manager responds that she just made deposit at bank and noticed man from apartment building who meets eyewitnesses' description. Police take man to teller, who cannot identify him. Police later search man's apartment and find cash and other evidence. At trial, police officer who has watched bank's security videotape testifies that man captured on videotape is man who robbed bank. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Defendant protests that officer's statement lacked foundation because officer lacked personal knowledge. But standard for personal knowledge under Fed. R. Evid. 602 is low. It is true that officer did not witness robbery. But his testimony, which became necessary when teller could not identify defendant, was grounded in descriptions supplied by witnesses and his own observation of videotape. Thus officer's testimony "was not simply conjecture, but was based on his personal observations and conclusions made during the course of his investigation." Defendant also says officer's statement was actually expert opinion that should have been excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 702 because unhelpful to trier of fact. But that objection was not raised at trial. In any event, it was really permissible lay opinion under Fed. R. Evid. 701, because it concerned identification of suspect, an area within lay competence. [Unless we are missing something, this opinion simply ignores Rule 701's failure to afford dispensation from the hearsay rule for lay opinion. -- ed.]

United States v. Rodgers, No. 02-3975 (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 2004) (unpublished), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1055 (2004). In bank robbery trial, prosecution presents criminalist's testimony on ballistics and footprint evidence. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Because defendant raised no objection at trial, review is for plain error. As regards footprint evidence, criminalist testified about his qualifications, his methods, and their general forensic acceptance. As regards ballistics, it is true that prosecution laid little foundation for expert's opinion. But expert did testify concerning his qualifications, and his "firing pin comparison" method was, at least, identified.

United States v. Olender, 338 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2003). Charged with possession of ammunition by felon, defendant offers testimony from criminologist, who seeks to comment adversely on police investigation, based on taped witness interviews, documents, and other evidence. District court concludes that expert testimony is unnecessary on question whether defendant possessed ammunition, because fact witnesses can offer direct evidence on that point. District court also declines to permit criminologist to offer lay opinion on same issues, because criminologist's testimony would lack requisite foundation in lay witness's personal knowledge. Jury convicts. Exclusion affirmed. No abuse of discretion.

United States v. Sanders, No. 01-2646 (6th Cir. Mar. 7, 2003) (unpublished), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 852 (2003). On trial for committing bank fraud in student loan applications, defendants object when prosecution offers handwriting analyst as expert. District court qualifies witness as expert and jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Defense objected only to witness's qualifications, and so defense failed to preserve issue of testimony's reliability under Daubert for appeal. In any case, district court did not err in admitting testimony from experienced handwriting analyst who carefully explained basis for his opinion.

United States v. Miller, No. 01-3959 (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 2003) (unpublished). Did handgun found in defendant's possession in Ohio travel in interstate commerce? ATF agent Nicholas Vouvalis opines for prosecution that it did, and jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Because defendant did not object to testimony at trial, review is for plain error. Agent had extensive training and expertise as firearms interstate nexus expert, and explained that his opinion was based on markings on gun indicating it was manufactured in Spain and imported via New Jersey.

United States v. Trammell, No. 01-3027 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2002) (unpublished). In narcotics trial, prosecutors offer FBI agent as expert in drug trafficking. District court finds scope of claimed expertise to be overbroad, and determines admissibility on question-by-question basis. Agent then testifies that amount of crack cocaine in defendant's possession exceeded normal quantities for personal use and was not "in a personal use form." Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Courts have routinely allowed law enforcement officers to testify as experts on narcotics trafficking because they possess knowledge and experience not within everyday experience of most jurors.

United States v. Smith, No. 00-5640 (6th Cir. Dec. 18, 2001) (unpublished), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1059 (2002). Defendants are convicted of bank robbery based on evidence including testimony from eyewitnesses and defendants' own girlfriends. On appeal, defendants argue that police forensic technician should not have been permitted to testify re microscopic examination of hair samples. Conviction affirmed. Forensic technician admitted that hair sample comparison includes subjective elements, but even if admitting forensic testimony was error, it was harmless, because evidence overwhelmingly supported guilt.

United States v. Glover, 265 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1145 (2002). Carjacking defendant objects when prosecution calls Agent Thomas Zimmer of National Insurance Crime Bureau to opine based on serial number that vehicle was manufactured outside Tennessee. District court admits testimony and jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Defendant complains that interstate nexus was ultimate question of fact that should have been left to jury. But ultimate decision whether to credit testimony did rest with jury. Properly qualified expert may testify that vehicle was manufactured outside state where sold when essential element of crime is movement of vehicle in interstate commerce.

United States v. Brown, No. 99-5395 (6th Cir. Sept. 6, 2000) (unpublished), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1175 (2001). Drug defendant contends he was just using, not selling, but prosecution offers testimony of Kentucky police officer that quantity of drugs and defendant's behavior indicate he possessed drugs with intent to distribute. Admissibility affirmed. Even though officer admitted he had never read studies drawing definitive link between quantity of drugs and intent to distribute, officer could opine based on years of experience in law enforcement.

Fair v. Franklin County, No. 98-4237 (6th Cir. May 11, 2000) (unpublished). Woman is arrested at sobriety checkpoint but later released without charges. She sues county and law enforcement personnel, alleging arrest without probable cause in violation of her civil rights. At trial, defendants offer testimony from police lieutenant re elements of probable cause. Jury returns verdict in defendants' favor. Affirmed. Officer's experience qualified him as expert, and any error in admitting his testimony was harmless.

Gates v. City of Memphis, No. 98-5921 (6th Cir. Apr. 6, 2000) (unpublished). Off-duty cop is shot and killed by on-duty cop. Widow brings civil rights and wrongful death action against city, and offers testimony on trajectory analysis from forensic consultant. District court excludes evidence because witness's experience and training have focused primarily on crime scene reconstruction in general, not trajectory analysis in particular. Jury returns verdict for defendants. Exclusion affirmed. Because witness had no formal training in trajectory analysis, had no post-secondary education in physics, anatomy, or physiology, made no measurements, and did no scientific testing on instant shooting scene, district court did not abuse discretion in excluding his testimony.

United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 926 (2003). FBI agent testifies as expert on organized crime in racketeering trial. Admissibility affirmed. Organized crime is subject beyond ken of average juror and agent had extensive experience in area.

United States v. Collins, No. 05-4279 (7th Cir. July 24, 2006) (unpublished). Defendant is convicted of possession of firearms by felon, after district court permits BATF Special Agent James Cronin to opine that defendant's weapons traveled in interstate commerce. Defendant's counsel seeks leave to withdraw on appeal, contending that no nonfrivolous appellate issues are presented. Withdrawal approved; appeal dismissed. Cronin is qualified by years of experience and training, and he relied on common and approved methods, including visual inspection of guns, research, and consultation with other experts. It would be frivolous to appeal lower court's decision admitting his testimony.

United States v. Garcia, 439 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 2006). In narcotics trial, prosecution offers expert opinion from Sergeant Robert Coleman, police officer, who testifies that drug traffickers do not ordinarily engage in transactions when innocent adults are present. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Defendant did not raise any Rule 702 objection at trial. Defendant also argues that permitting this testimony violated his presumption-of-innocence rights, but in combination with other evidence, sergeant's testimony rationally supported inference of guilt, without imposing any mandatory requirement that jury accept that inference.

Pasha v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2005). Albanian woman seeking asylum on grounds of political persecution presents immigration judge with nine Albanian documents, including subpoenas, police report, and summons. Immigration service offers testimony from forensic document examiner Gideon Epstein, who opines that four of those documents are probably forged, because they do not contain diacritical marks and because Albania cannot afford color laser printers. Immigration judge denies asylum and Board of Immigration Appeals affirms. Admissibility reversed. Although Daubert does not literally govern in immigration proceedings, "spirit of Daubert" applies. Expert admitted lack of knowledge on printing technology available in Albania. Considering number of asylum applicants from Albania, and considering that between 400,000 and one million Albanians reside in United States, Department of Homeland Security should be able to produce some witness competent to testify to likelihood that documents barren of diacritical marks and produced by color laser printing were probably forged.

United States v. Moore, 425 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 2005). In prosecution for cocaine distribution, government relies on testimony from forensic chemist Jennifer Yezek. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Defendant purports to raise Daubert challenge to expert's testimony, but defendant's only specific argument is that her testimony was unreliable because government failed to establish chain of custody for drugs she analyzed. Prosecution's evidence on chain of custody was sufficient, and district court therefore did not abuse its discretion.

United States v. Davenport, No. 05-1336 (7th Cir. Oct. 7, 2005) (unpublished), cert. denied, 164 L. Ed. 2d 111 (2006). Charged with interstate transportation of minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, defendant protests to no avail when prosecution offers expert testimony from Kenneth Lanning (former FBI agent with extensive experience in child abuse issues) on how pedophiles use internet to exploit children. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Defendant says Lanning's testimony was obvious, but purpose of expert social scientific testimony may legitimately be to sift fact from fiction and disabuse jurors of mistaken "common knowledge." Defendant says Lanning intimidated jurors, but he did not threaten them in any way. Defendant finally objects that Lanning's testimony invaded province of jury, but that objection has not been valid since 1975 adoption of Federal Rules of Evidence (see Fed. R. Evid. 704(a)).

United States v. Gray, 410 F.3d 338 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1177 (2006). DEA agent testifies re drug code language in narcotics prosecution. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Agent had 12 years of experience as narcotics officer, boasted specialized training, and also had experience with these defendants. He was sufficiently qualified.

United States v. Parra, 402 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1181 (2006). Prosecution relies on testimony from DEA agent on modus operandi of drug dealers. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Agent has extensive training and experience. Defendant argues that agent has not previously testified as expert witness, but "there is a first time in court for every expert." District court observed proper safeguards to deal with witness's dual capacity as fact witness and expert. His testimony was helpful to jury, and was not more prejudicial than probative. No abuse of discretion.

United States v. Allen, 390 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2004). Police forensic expert Thomas Pitzen testifies at bank robbery trial that shoes defendant was wearing at time of arrest could have made tennis shoe impression left in cement dust at scene of crime. Jury convicts and defendant appeals. Admissibility affirmed. Defendant says that expert's testimony did not satisfy Daubert's relevance prong, because expert testified that match was not definitive, but expert need not opine on ultimate issue to be of assistance to trier of fact. Defendant also argues that subject matter did not call for expert testimony, because laypersons could compare impression with shoe. But witnesses testified for prosecution at evidentiary hearing that shoeprint evaluation requires trained eyes. Defendant also contends that testimony was unreliable. But same witnesses testified at evidentiary hearing that shoeprint identification techniques are generally accepted and subject to peer review.

United States v. Ceballos, 385 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1871 (2005). Over defendants' objections, DEA agent Michael Kress testifies in narcotics trial on meaning of drug code language used by defendants in intercepted communications. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Defendants protest that conversations were in Spanish, in which agent is not fluent. District court did not abuse discretion in permitting agent to testify based on translations of those conversations.

United States v. George, 363 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2004). Criminal defendant unsuccessfully objects to prosecution's introduction of expert testimony re fingerprint identification. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Seventh Circuit has previously held that fingerprint identification is generally accepted, has low rate of error, and can be objectively tested. As for defendant's complaint that identification was unreliable because based on partial prints, issue of whether prints match is best left to trier of fact. No abuse of discretion.

United States v. Williams, No. 02-4361 (7th Cir. Mar. 24, 2004) (unpublished). Defendant is charged with possession of firearms by felon. To prove that weapons traveled in foreign and interstate commerce, prosecution offers testimony from ATF firearms expert John Phinney. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Defendant did not challenge expert's testimony below, and so review is for plain error. Expert has five years' ATF experience, attended ATF's "Interstate Nexus School," also has military training on firearms identification, and has testified as expert on interstate nexus issues on four previous occasions. No abuse of discretion.

United States v. Bowman, 353 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2003). In prosecution for possession of handgun by felon, policeman testifies he found weapon in defendant's pocket during search incident to arrest and removed magazine and one bullet from chamber to make weapon "safe." His testimony is corroborated by his partner. Defendant, however, claims gun was planted, and offers testimony from three friends and relatives who witnessed arrest and claim that police retrieved no weapon. To bolster police officers' testimony, prosecution calls ATF fingerprint expert Richard Canty, who testifies to finding palm print and thumbprint on handgun, but says they do not match defendant and have not been positively identified. Over defendant's objection, prosecution asks Canty whether location of thumbprint is consistent with hypothesis that someone left print while making weapon "safe." Canty answers affirmatively. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Defendant argues that Canty, although qualified as fingerprint expert, was not qualified as expert in gun handling. Defendant moreover contends that Canty's testimony was not founded on reliable methods or data. But Canty has 37 years' experience in recovering prints from weapons, and demonstrated his familiarity with this handgun during his testimony.

Gebrendrias v. Ashcroft, No. 02-4254 (7th Cir. Oct. 14, 2003) (unpublished) (see the briefs). Ethiopian woman seeks asylum, claiming fear of persecution based on her membership in Oromo Liberation Front ("OLF"). In support, she offers letter vouching for her OLF membership. Government offers testimony from forensic document examiner Larry F. Ziegler, who opines that letter is forged. Immigration judge credits expert's testimony and denies asylum. Board of Immigrations Appeals affirms. Admissibility affirmed. Woman argues that expert's testimony did not satisfy Daubert, but traditional rules of evidence do not apply in immigration proceedings, where sole test for admissibility is whether evidence is "probative" and "fundamentally fair." Expert was well-qualified, and pointed to various attributes (e.g., paper size, spacing of characters, photocopying of seal) credibly indicating that document was not of Ethiopian origin.

Deputy v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 345 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2003) (see the briefs). Is that plaintiff's signature on arbitration agreement? Defendants say yes, relying on testimony from handwriting expert Diane Marsh. But district court excludes her testimony, finding it scientifically unreliable, and also concluding that expert gave misleading answer about whether her testimony had ever been found unreliable in previous cases. Exclusion reversed. Expert's answer re previous testimony was not inaccurate, and district court misread earlier decision in so concluding. District court's reliability analysis focused too heavily, and improperly, on credibility issues, rather than soundness of expert's methods. Testimony from handwriting experts is not admissible per se, but district court should conduct proper Daubert analysis on remand.

Buie v. McAdory, 341 F.3d 623 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1061 (2003). At state murder trial, forensic expert Maria Pulling testifies that hair samples from crime scene came from defendant. On federal habeas review, defendant argues that state trial judge violated due process by permitting expert to overstate strength of her conclusions. District court denies relief. Affirmed. Even assuming expert was mistaken, Constitution does not impose Fed. R. Evid. 702 on state courts. Defendant was duly afforded what constitutional rights he had -- i.e., opportunity to cross-examine expert and present contrary evidence.

United States v. Sutton, 337 F.3d 792 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1050 (2003). During investigation of armed robberies, government investigators collect fingerprints from locations that robbers touched. Analysis by police lab concludes that prints do not match those of suspects who are charged. At trial, suspects seek to introduce lab reports to show innocence. District court excludes reports because "without an expert to explain them, they are of no evidentiary value." Jury convicts. Exclusion affirmed. Defendants urge that reports at issue are self-authenticating public records falling within hearsay exception in Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(C). Defendants are correct. Under Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988), hearsay exception in Rule 803(8)(C) encompasses opinions and is not limited to purely factual evidence. But hearsay issues relate only to form of testimony, not its substantive admissibility. District court did not invoke any specific evidentiary rule in excluding reports, but its decision can be interpreted as one excluding evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 403 because reports, although relevant, were more prejudicial than probative without live expert testimony to explain them. Alternatively, district court may have intended exclusion to rest on Daubert. There is no question that fingerprint analysis, as general methodology, satisfies Daubert. But reports merely stated bald conclusions, and district court could have concluded, in its sound discretion, that record failed to demonstrate that fingerprint methodology was reliably applied. Alternatively, any error was harmless.

United States v. Mansoori, 304 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 967 (2003). In drug conspiracy trial, district court permits police officer and gang specialist Michael Cronin to offer opinion testimony on history, leadership, and operations of Traveling Vice Lords. Jury convicts. Admissibility affirmed. Defendants do not dispute officer's qualifications as gang expert but contend that testimony's prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, because nonexpert eyewitness testimony on operations of Traveling Vice Lords would have been perfectly comprehensible to jurors without expert assistance, and because officer's dual role as fact witness and expert may have confused jurors, leading them to credit officer's opinion testimony as brute fact. But officer's opinion testimony offered helpful background, because average juror would be unfamiliar with operations of narcotics traffickers and street gangs. Dangers may arise when law enforcement officers testify in dual capacities of fact witness and expert, but testimony in both capacities is not prohibited, and lines between fact and opinion testimony were clearly demarcated during presentation of witness's testimony to jury.

United States v. Ceballos, 302 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1137 (2003). DEA agents testify as experts on drug trafficking in criminal trial. Admissibility affirmed. Agents were qualified by training and experienc