Beck & Herrmann on "Reasonable Medical Certainty": Part I
Beck & Herrmann attempt to rebut three arguments offered by the ALI in favor of abandoning any RDC requirement: (1) that the medical and scientific communities have no such “reasonable certainty” standard; (2) that the requirement imposes a more demanding standard for admissibility than the law imposes for satisfaction of the burden of persuasion in civil cases; and (3) that the RDC standard affords no effective guarantee of the soundness of the expert’s analysis.
We’ll respond to Beck & Herrmann’s specific critiques of the three ALI arguments in a second installment. In this first post, we will: (a) discuss how the RDC rule appears to have originated; (b) attempt some description of the demands it may currently impose; and (c) consider some of the functions it might aspirationally perform.
A. Historical Antecedents
The rule is most routinely implicated, of course, in expert testimony from physicians – the paradigmatic evidentiary context on which Beck & Herrmann also focus. They say the rule has been in place for “generations.” To be more precise, its judicial adoption appears to date from the 1960s.
In a 1998 Maryland Law Review article, Jeff L. Lewin (a Pennsylvania attorney and an adjunct professor of law at Widener University) makes a convincing case that the practice of asking medical experts to state their opinions to a “reasonable degree of medical certainty” was first adopted by the Chicago trial bar, sometime before 1930, in specific response to distinct features of the local legal ecology. See generally Jeff L. Lewin, The Genesis and Evolution of Legal Uncertainty About “Reasonable Medical Certainty,” 57 Md. L. Rev. 380 (1998).
In the beginning, according to Lewin, was the “reasonable certainty” rule, which involved the standard of proof for damages attributable to medical conditions from which the plaintiff might suffer in the future. By the end of the nineteenth century, it was a well-established principle under the Illinois precedents, as well as the law of other jurisdictions, that a plaintiff could not recover damages attributable to future medical symptoms or conditions unless the plaintiff could show they were reasonably certain to occur. This was originally treated as a substantive sufficiency requirement but was later adopted, in a series of
During the same period, Lewin notes, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted a form of the “ultimate issue” rule that barred physicians from expressing definitive opinions on causation. Testimony that some factor did in fact cause the plaintiff’s injuries was seen as an encroachment on the jury’s ultimate fact-finding prerogative. Physician testimony about what “might have caused” the injury was permissible, but expert opinion that some factor actually did cause the injury was inadmissible. To modern legal ears, such a rule may sound paradoxical. But such was
These “reasonable certainty” and “ultimate opinion” rules were obviously in significant tension. Although some of the details remain shrouded behind history’s veil, Lewin offers substantial lexical evidence that the phrase “reasonable medical certainty” originated among personal injury and worker’s compensation counsel in Illinois, in the effort to frame questions compliant with both rules – e.g., “Doctor, have you formed an opinion, based on a reasonable medical certainty, as to what may or could have been the cause of plaintiff’s condition?” By the 1930s,
In the 1960s, the expression’s incidence in judicial opinions rose exponentially. Many decisions from this period attached no special legal significance to the phrase, which often appeared in quotations from trial testimony. In some jurisdictions, however, courts began to embrace “reasonable medical certainty” as a standard for admissibility. Lewin posits (plausibly in our view) that by then, the phrase had come to enjoy such widespread currency as a term of testimonial art that some lawyers and judges simply assumed it embodied a hallowed legal requirement, often with little explicit reflection on what, precisely, it meant.
However that may be, the standard was not universally accepted – and where accepted, it was not always assigned the same meaning. In
B. Current Doctrine
In the wake of the 1975 adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in Daubert, and the adoption of the federal standards for expert testimony in many states, courts do not nowadays lack for methods by which to screen expert testimony. In consequence, the RDC rule plays a less prominent evidentiary role than it may have done at common law.
There is considerable ambiguity, in short, about what, precisely, may be the current status and contours of the standard whose potential “abolition” Beck & Herrmann bemoan.1 This, by itself, might be counted as a mark against a legal standard, but we will not pursue that argument any further for now.
C. The Standard’s Potential Functions
Whatever its actual current meaning in the jurisdictions still adhering to it, the requirement that expert testimony reflect a “reasonable degree” of medical, professional, or scientific “certainty” might hypothetically assume any of multiple forms. The rule might require the witnesses themselves to attest that their opinions are held to a “reasonable degree of certainty.” It might condition admissibility on a judicial determination that their testimony is of RDC caliber. It might make RDC a part of the sufficiency calculus. Or it might combine some or all of those requirements:
The “Reasonable Degree of Certainty” Standard: Seven Potential Versions | |||
| Expert Must Profess RDC | Actual RDC Is a Necessary Condition for Admissibility | Actual RDC Is a Necessary Condition for Sufficiency |
1 | X | X | X |
2 | X | X | |
3 | X | | X |
4 | X | | |
5 | | X | X |
6 | | X | |
7 | | | X |
The appropriate form (if any) for an RDC rule might depend on the functions it is intended to perform. We will focus here on just two such functions, because we think they’re the most plausible candidates. We will paint them with an admittedly broad brush.
1. The Liability-Minimizing Function
The rule’s use to perform this liability-limiting function would seemingly represent a policy decision that certain fields of professional and/or commercial endeavor deserve special forms of legal protection (a policy animus also operative, for example, in many state statutes governing the competency of experts to testify on the standard of care in malpractice cases). We do not propose to weigh in on that policy question here. We will instead offer only a few more limited observations.
First, the pursuit of substantive agendas through evidentiary or procedural means has sometimes resulted in debasement of policy discourse (because the strategy is sometimes adopted for the very purpose of presenting substantively controversial policy agendas in misleading terms – i.e., in bland procedural clothing). Subject to that caveat, however, there is nothing instrinsically reprehensible or wrongheaded about pursuing substantive goals through procedural methods, so long as the substantive policy agenda is made explicit. To their credit, Beck & Herrmann are reasonably disclosing about theirs.
Second, this strategy for insulating certain favored classes of defendant from certain forms of liability would be an indirect strategy. Not that there’s anything wrong with that. We do it all the time. We try to protect criminal defendants from wrongful incarceration by giving them the right to confront the witnesses against them. We try to prevent accidents by regulating motor vehicle speed. But whenever we pursue some policy goal through indirection, it is reasonable to ask what incremental contribution the means will make to achieving the end, at what collateral cost, and whether some other means might be better tailored to the task.
Third, although the liability-limiting agenda under discussion would be consistent with several alternative implementations of the RDC rule, it does suggest certain directions for implementation. It suggests, for example, that the requirement might apply specifically to medical testimony, or testimony about the causation of personal injury (or certain types of claim involving personal injury), rather than to expert testimony more generally. It suggests, as well, that the requirement might extend beyond the mere demand that experts employ a certain form of words in describing the confidence with which they hold their opinions (i.e., beyond Version 4). It suggests, that is, that in the course of their admissibility and/or sufficiency decisions, the courts might also participate in evaluating whether the evidence possesses whatever degree of “certainty” the rule requires (as in Versions 1-3). Such a judicial evaluation might even be prescribed in the absence of any requirement for an expert attestation (as in Versions 5-7).
2. The Confidence-Testing Function
A second function the rule might perform would relate more to the goal of promoting the trustworthiness of expert opinion testimony more generally, by adding a layer of screening at the level of the expert’s own intellectual conscience. Once again, such a function would be consistent with multiple alternative implementations of the rule. But once again, some plausible directions for implementation are suggested. Even if it were felt, for example, that existing tests for sufficiency and admissibility provide basically adequate tools for gauging the probativeness and warranted assertibility of expert testimony (or that they would provide adequate tools for those purposes after some judicious tinkering), concern might still arise over the sincerity of expert opinion; its honesty, if you will. Because it is precisely opinion testimony we’re discussing, perjury laws cannot be expected to do a very good job at deterring experts from presenting opinions that may be methodologically defensible, to one degree or another, but in which the experts do not, in their heart of hearts, feel much confidence (i.e., truly believe). No doubt the temptation for experts to bend their testimony in the client’s favor, within whatever limits the rules on reliability may permit, is not one that any plausible evidentiary measure could hope to eliminate fully. But something might be gained from requiring experts to say, under oath, that they hold their opinions at some reasonably high level of confidence. At least some subset of experts -- some whose own consciences would not permit them to make such an attestation, plus some others who would fear for their reputations if they did – would balk.
Our throat now cleared, we will turn, in the next installment, to the specifics of the Beck & Herrmann argument.
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1 The very decisions that Beck & Herrmann cite as exemplary embodiments of the RDC standard serve as vivid illustrations of the standard’s ambiguity. They say they are “very comfortable,” for example, with the standard articulated in State v. Jackson, 92 Ohio St. 3d 436, 448, 751 N.E.2d 946, 961 (2001). In the course of rejecting an objection that testimony should have been expressed as “probable” rather than “reasonably certain,” the
Beck & Herrmann are also “very comfortable” with the very different version of the RDC standard espoused in McMahon v. Young, 442 Pa. 484, 485-86, 276 A.2d 534, 535 (1971) (mere probability insufficient for medical testimony), and Corrado v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 790 A.2d 1022, 1031 (Pa. Super. 2001) (even “very highly probable” would be insufficient).
Both the
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