9th Circuit Upholds Testimony from FBI Accountant

In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit has upheld the trial court's decision admitting testimony from an FBI accountant about the defendants' securities fraud and money laundering scheme. From the opinion:

Cross alleges that the admission of the testimony of FBI Special Agent Steve Eidson, an accountant specializing in white collar crime, violated the helpfulness requirement of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and that he did not qualify as a summary witness under Rule 1008. While neither party disputes Eidson's qualifications as an expert, Cross contends Edison's testimony consisted entirely of a summary and inferences that the jury could have reached independently of expert testimony and that the testimony therefore violated the helpfulness requirement. See U.S. v. Benson, 941 F.2d 598, 605 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding IRS agent testimony was in violation of helpfulness requirement where "[the agent] had nothing to offer on this question that would assist the jury's understanding of the issue"). Cross further argues that Eidson's testimony is duplicative and therefore prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Cross's counsel did not make any objections at trial, so we review for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).

We must consider Eidson's testimony not only as summary but as that of an expert, as Eidson testified about conclusions he drew from the data. The district court did not plainly err in allowing both Eidson's summary testimony and expert conclusions. The funds used by the defendants flowed through at least twelve separate accounts. In formulating his testimony, Eidson reviewed approximately a hundred banker's boxes containing several thousand pages of records. The tracing of money from the individual investors to their ultimate disposition is anything but simple. The analysis is not, as Cross contends, "something which Edison was no more qualified to do than the jury." Instead, the district court permissibly relied on Eidson's testimony as that of an expert able to make these complex transactions more accessible to the jury through both summary and analysis.

See United States v. Fox, No. 02-50022 (9th Cir. Jan. 6, 2005) (B. Fletcher, Noonan, & Paez, JJ.).